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Paradigms and Our Shrinking Bioethics
PETER CHERBAS*
Carl Schneider's "empirical perspective" on the contemporary bioethical
landscape allocates pride of place to the physician-patient relationship and,
within that relationship, to the notion of patient autonomy. According to his
analysis, autonomy plays a paradigmatic role in medical ethics but, because
the paradigm hangs on an oversimplified understanding of human relation-
ships, it requires refurbishment or replacement. Such reservations (indeed,
almost any reservations) concerning the role 6f autonomy challenge medical
ethics on its most cherished theoretical territory and are certain to provoke
considerable debate. Since I find Schneider's observations both persuasive and
provocative, I look forward to that debate. However, because my own
background' has equipped me with neither the knowledge nor the experience
to contribute to it, I propose to follow Professor Schneider's lead in a
different direction.
As teachers, we discover that predicting what will puzzle beginners is a
tricky business. Students breeze through our favorite "hard" problems only to
get stuck on other, superficially simpler, ones fraught with unstated assump-
tions. As a neophyte bioethicist, I sympathize with their plight because, for
me, the bioethics literature is most puzzling precisely where it is least
contentious. Ample illustration can be drawn from the widely shared premises
asserted at the top of the previous paragraph: What accounts for the fact that
bioethics-a field that began, at least in some conceptions,2 with an
expansive philosophical program-has been so tamed and confined that it is
effectively synonymous with medical ethics? Why do its practitioners interpret
their domain still more narrowly, restricting it to physician-patient relation-
ships or more commonly to the enumeration of physicians' obligations? Why,
when even that restricted domain ought to spawn a philosopher's feast of
contending ethical claims, is the literature dominated by one recurrent
theme-respect for patient autonomy? 3 Why is the scope of bioethics not
itself a matter of intense controversy?
* Professor, Department of Biology, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. 1 am a molecular biologist/geneticist who has been learning bioethics as part of a group studying
the ethical implications of genetic diagnosis. It is appropriate in this connection to acknowledge the
efforts of my teachers, the members of the Poynter Center project on presymptomatic diagnosis, as well
as the helpful financial support provided by a Mid Career Fellowship from the Dean of the Faculties,
Indiana University-Bloomington.
2. For example, the biologist Van Rensselaer Potter has described his early use of the term-to
denote a field of ethical study enriched by a biological (ecological) perspective-and the displacement
of that usage by the decidedly narrower one popularized by the Georgetown Center. Van Rensselaer
Potter, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic Revisited: Two Kinds of Bioethics, 30 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED.
157 (1987).
3. There is substantial evidence that autonomy does not yet dominate clinical practice. See, e.g.,
RuTH MAcKuN, ENEMIES OF PATIENTS (1993) (that there is a schism between theory and practice does
not explain the single-mindedness of the theory).
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Since these are fundamental (some might say naive) questions, a variety of
reasonable answers are probably at hand. I want to sketch the outline of an
unusual kind of answer, one suggested by the curious fact that this sympo-
sium-a gathering devoted to contemporary bioethics-has reverberated with
allusions to a model for the growth of scientific knowledge. Initially, those
references impressed me as surprising, dissonant, and probably rhetorical. On
further consideration, I am still surprised, but only by the extent to which they
are both appropriate and substantive. There are important parallels between
the development of bioethics and the growth of scientific knowledge, and our
title is an invocation not simply of Thomas Kuhn's words, but of his ideas.
Understanding those similarities and defining their legitimate limits are tasks
that bear directly on the questions of scope that animate this essay.
According to Kuhn's justly celebrated model,4 knowledge grows by a
cyclical process marked by alternating phases of crisis and normal science.
Rotation of this historical wheel is paced by the transitions between its
phases, transitions that correspond to changes in the condition of the
paradigm. We will not stray far if, despite certain ambiguities,5 we suppose
that a Kuhnian paradigm is, at its core, a methodological precedent. It is a
concrete algorithm, procedure, or approach that has solved a significant
problem and therefore promises to solve more and, as such, it is a model that
will be transmitted to newcomers by their mentors and their textbooks. During
a crisis, no shared paradigm is available and scientists' activities are guided
by the need to locate one. Success leads to a productive period of normal
science, of "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achieve-
ments, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice."6 Thus:
The success of a paradigm . . . is at the start largely a promise of success
discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science
consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by
extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as
particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those
facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articulation of the
paradigm itself.7
Eventually all paradigms lose their utility in the face of new problems, and
the shared perception of the paradigm's exhaustion is what precipitates a new
crisis.
4. For the seminal reference, see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]. Kuhn has elaborated on his ideas in many settings.
See generally THOMAS S. KuN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION (1977); Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery
or Psychology of Research, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Imre Lakatos & Alan
Musgrave eds., 1970) [hereinafter Logic of Discovery]; Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflection on My Critics, in
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra.
5. Margaret Masterman noted-in the course of a sympathetic treatment of Kuhn's ideas-that she
could identify at least 21 distinguishable meanings for "paradigm." Margaret Masterman, The Nature
of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 59, 61.
6. SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 4, at 10.
7. Id. at 23-24.
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This is an intensely practical viewpoint akin to Medawar's description of
science as "the art of the soluble."8 One aspect of that practicality is that
Kuhn's model is, relatively speaking, at ease with the roles that extrinsic
forces may play in shaping intellectual movements. For example, it will be
relevant to our concerns that a paradigm is what defines a discipline:
[I]t is sometimes just its reception of a paradigm that transforms a group
previously interested merely in the study of nature into a profession or, at
least, a discipline. In the sciences (though not in fields like medicine,
technology, and law, of which the principal raison d'gtre is an external
social need), the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of
specialists' societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum
have usually been associated with a group's first reception of a single
paradigm.9
Finally, it is especially pertinent to this discussion that adoption of a
paradigm simultaneously creates a discipline and narrows its scope. This is
necessarily so because, in normal science, the paradigm provides a "criterion
for choosing problems that ... can be assumed to have solutions. To a great
extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific
or encourage its members to undertake.'" The necessary penalty for
progress, a penalty willingly paid until the time of crisis, is tunnel vision:
Perhaps these are defects. The areas investigated by normal science are, of
course, miniscule; the enterprise now under discussion has drastically
restricted vision. But those restrictions, born from confidence in a
paradigm, turn out to be essential to the development of science. By
focusing attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the
paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and
depth that would otherwise be unimaginable. And normal science possesses
a built-in mechanism that ensures the relaxation of the restrictions that
bound research whenever the paradigm from which they derive ceases to
function effectively. At that point scientists begin to behave differently and
the nature of their research problems changes."
This skeletal pr6cis is probably sufficient by itself to suggest some of the
directions of my argument. Kuhn focused on scientific history, specifically
exempting fields driven by "explicit social need;" nonetheless, many of his
observations might have been drawn from any developing discipline. No
matter the field, professionalization is attended by common demands, among
which are the dual needs to define a set of legitimate problems and to stake
out territory. Certainly these demands describe bioethics, a discipline that has
always struggled to define its own niche in an intellectual landscape claimed
by guild rules, etiquette, religion, politics, and law. A good part of that sense
of resonance with which non-scientists read Kuhn is attributable simply to
such universal pressures and it will be quite unnecessary for us to invoke, in
8. PETER B. MEDAWAR, THE ART OF THE SOLUBLE (1967).
9. SCiENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 4, at 19.
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 24.
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addition, what Karl Popper labeled "scientism"' 2 and what we might more
colloquially call "science envy." However, loose similarities and vague
resonances can mask fundamental differences; at the very least, they do not
absolve us of the obligation to ask how-and to what effect-Kuhn's model
describes contemporary bioethics.
Ethical reasoning begins with analysis. In some traditions that analysis
consists of locating a problem amid the competing dictates of diverse
principles. For bioethicists the canonical formulation in terms of autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice will be most familiar, 3 and analysis
is the process of describing how each of these may bear on the problem at
hand. In an alternative tradition, 14 analysis entails locating any new problem
in a taxonomy of previously "solved" cases and, in the process, specifying
how each such case might be construed as a guiding precedent. No matter the
tradition, ethical analysis is the substance of our discipline; it is an art that
educates and sensitizes, illuminating unexpected parallels, palliating moral
tone-deafness, and providing early warnings of unintended logical consequenc-
es. So long as these are the goals, analysis suffices.
However, these are seldom the only goals and, whatever may have been true
historically, authentic practical demands ensure that they cannot be the whole
story in contemporary bioethics. In diverse settings-hospital ethics
committees, courtrooms, legislative arenas, and the press-a professional
bioethicist is an "expert witness" who is expected to conclude the analysis by
resolving contending claims and offering a prescription. It may not be too
much to say that the emergence of bioethics as a professional discipline with
a distinct identity has turned on its ability to satisfy this demand. What is
remarkable is that so many bioethicists have felt able to meet this need, albeit
for a limited class of problems. It is remarkable because our discipline
proclaims no formulas for resolving the opposing claims of competing
principles and/or precedents; we have no ethical arithmetic. Indeed the
textbooks-of both traditions-teach us to analyze, then they fall silent.
My inference is that an unstated formula does exist and that it has played
a paradigmatic role in creating and sustaining bioethics as a practical
discipline. The algorithm itself is simple and concise: Analysis may allot full
measures of respect to a variety of values and interests, but disputes will be
resolved in favor of patient autonomy. This is not intended to be an astringent
rendering; it captures accurately the flavor of much of the literature to which
I have been exposed during my apprenticeship and it is merely a plainer
specification of what others have called the autonomy paradigm.
It is no part of my purpose to dispute the importance of autonomy. Instead
I am making a case that, whatever the intellectual issues, adoption of the
autonomy algorithm has played a pivotal and surprising role in the
12. KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTrVE KNOWLEDGE (1972).
13. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (3d ed.
1989).
14. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL
REASONING (1988).
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development of bioethics as a practical field. After all, for the literate
observer transplanted from a previous century the intriguing mystery would
be how ethics, a field of provocateurs concerned to shake certainties, can have
evolved into an expert discipline dispensing them. The answer is that a
technical field of bioethics has been fashioned in response to specific needs,
notably the perceived needs to control medical paternalism and institute
informed consent. That technical field is guided by an algorithm that serves
as a paradigm and its history conforms to Kuhn's model.
Technical disciplines are seldom static. They originate in full-scale
revolutions propelled by novel paradigms, then evolve through periodic phases
of turbulence resolved by recognizable, if greatly modified, new paradigms.
No matter the magnitude of the shift, what has been learned from the
ancestral paradigm is seldom unlearned. Thus, optics has survived many
paradigm shifts while remaining a distinct and recognizable discipline that
employs tools from many eras: My eyeglasses were designed using equations
that are centuries old, without even passing reference to quantum optics.
Professor Schneider envisions just this kind of evolution for the technical field
of bioethics. When he suggests that bioethics needs new paradigms, I take it
that he is seeking a modified algorithm-one that hangs from a broader, more
flexible, and more realistic conception of patient needs and desires-but an
algorithm nonetheless. It is an interesting question whether the technical field
of bioethics will prove susceptible to this kind of evolution. If it is precisely
by its inflexibility that the autonomy algorithm has fashioned a discipline
emancipated from the traditional ambiguities of ethical analysis, the answer
is far from obvious.
Whatever that answer, it cannot obscure a more fundamental issue.
Paradigms, whether they be new or old, animate emerging disciplines, not ab
initio but at the expense of those more expansive and ambitious fields that
were their antecedents. Thus Kuhnian revolution, like its political counterpart
and unlike biological evolution, occurs by replacement. It is, of course,
inevitable that energy and enthusiasm should flow from a tired and conten-
tious endeavor to one that is vigorous, confident, and successful. It requires
more effort, bolstered by newfound authority and prestige, to -revise the
boundaries of worthwhile inquiry by excluding many of the questions formerly
considered central. Thus the straightforward question "How can a force act at
a distance?" stood squarely in the path of advances in physics until Newton's
triumphs rendered it unscientific. Similarly, transmutation of the elements was
one of the defining goals of alchemy. Chemistry reduced this goal to the
status of non-science, where it remained until it was enveloped by nuclear
physics.
It is precisely this Kuhnian linkage that accounts for the diminished
aspirations reflected in the questions that introduced this essay. From a larger
world of concerns called bioethics, a technical field-also called bioeth-
ics-has emerged. Because of its focus it has flourished; despite its focus it
has assumed the station of the parent discipline. By such reductionism has
bioethics been transformed into a library of commentaries on physicians'
110919941
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codes of conduct. In this portrait, the failings of the current paradigm are
secondary. What is primary is the suspicion that there is something illegiti-
mate about a paradigm-driven bioethics. Surely this suspicion is related to
Kuhn's insistence that disciplines responsive to explicit social need cannot
follow the same rules as those dedicated to the growth of knowledge. When
basic scientists select research problems, it is a matter of parochial interest.
Important questions, neglected in favor of tractable ones, can await the
turning of the wheel and its yield of new paradigms. The research strategy
described by these statements may apply imperfectly even to basic science, 5
but they capture accurately the logical implications of the notion that a
discipline is guided by a paradigm. They describe a strategy ill-adapted to
address those immediate and compelling public needs that mandate the
existence of the healing professions. Certainly they do not describe anyone's
a priori aspirations for bioethics.
This symposium has been directed to "emerging paradigms," and I have
taken it as my purpose to explore some of the implications of that language.
Whether those implications do, as I have suggested, describe contemporary
bioethics-whether, specifically, the scope of bioethics has undergone a
Kuhnian contraction-is a question that readers must judge against their
experience of the field and its literature. In the area with which I am most
familiar-bioethicists' responses to the social impact of advances in human
genetics-Kuhn is precisely on the mark. Considerations of space will limit
me to a few, rudimentary illustrations.
In their foreword to a book that serves as the most authoritative introduction
to the ethical issues surrounding the Human Genome Project, James D.
Watson and Eric T. Juengst consider the implications of genetic knowledge
by listing some of those for whom such knowledge can create difficult
choices.' 6 Their list cannot be faulted; it includes individuals, families,
health professionals, employers, insurers, the courts, social institutions,
governments, and society. However, if this list represents an agenda, it is not
one that the bioethical community has adopted. For some of the larger
categories, the silence of bioethicists is masked by the efforts of those whose
perspective is purely legal. With respect to the ethical obligations of
individuals and families, it is stunning. The following passage concerning
"Individual/Family Issues" fairly represents the nature of that silence. "These
issues include what information can be collected, how, by whom, on whose
authority, for what purpose, how and to whom the information is disclosed,
15. I have no desire to stumble onto the battlefield where historians and sociologists of science
dispute the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic influences. Certainly, if there is a boundary
between pure and applied, it is and always has been ambiguous. I ask only that a generous reader accept
my description as one aspect of the life of any real scientist in a basic setting.
16. James D. Watson & Eric T. Juengst, Doing Science in the Real World: The Role ofEthics, Law,
and the Social Sciences in the Human Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS
AS GUIDES xv, xvi (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992).
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ownership of the technology, and the consequences for the individual and
family."
1 7
Such a treatment distorts the issues to fit the paradigmatic box. It reflects
the strangely paternalistic assumption that individuals (and families) are not
themselves actors in the ethical drama. Yet even if we agree completely on
the question "Who shall decide?", the corollary question "What shall they
decide?" does not lack ethical content. Consider a concrete example. Suppose
that my niece is at risk for Huntington's Disease ("HD") and she desires to
be tested. Until recently, that test has required DNA samples from family
members. Am I under any ethical obligation to provide the needed sample?
Now suppose that there were a presymptomatic treatment for HD, perhaps a
dietary regimen akin to that used to ameliorate the effects of phenylketonuria.
Would the existence of that option modify my obligations? Some will object
that ethicists cannot dictate to patients. I agree, but as the subject of this
example, I would remain free to assert my autonomy even if a genetic
counselor were to offer guidance concerning the consequences of my choice.
Moreover, my autonomous opinion would be formed in a moral climate that
could be molded, at least in part, by ethical discussion. The quasi-legal test
of whether one can and should dictate is the province of the technical field
of bioethics; it has no bearing on the need for ethical analysis.
The particular example is a narrow one, but it can be applied to a much
wider range of situations in which the burden of decision-making falls not on
a practitioner but on the patient and his or her family. Such situations are in
no way special to genetics. Indeed, many bioethicists will think immediately
of decisions to terminate treatment near the end of life. These are especially
pertinent to my argument, for when a patient is incompetent and no surrogate
is available, practitioners are forced either to use substituted judgment or to
act in the best interests of the patient-in short, to adopt the family's
viewpoint and bear their ethical burdens. The fact that the relevant commen-
taries 8 focus exclusively on the procedural question-who shall de-
cide-reflects the understandable but unfortunate reluctance of ethicists to
offer families anything more than the "right" to decide.
My argument goes beyond the observation that some questions are
uncomfortable and difficult, to the assertion that, for the experienced
bioethicist, they no longer exist. Discussion groups provide an interesting
experimental test, and over the last few years I have considered cases like
these with a variety of groups. What has impressed me most has been the
speed with which these exchanges become focused on the narrow question of
patient rights. With sophisticated groups-those with prior experience of
bioethics-the transformation is virtually instantaneous.
17. George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, The Major Social Policy Issues Raised by the Human
Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES, supra note 16, at 3, 7.
18. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST
CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY (1992).
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The examples illustrate a failure to guide individuals and families. One
consequence of autonomy is that this reluctance translates into an unwilling-
ness to guide society. However vague the connection may appear with respect
to current problems, it will be revealed in full by the developments in
genetics. Thomas Schelling has made the case especially vividly:
If most of you do not much care whether your child is right or left handed
but, given a choice, slightly prefer she not be left-handed in case it
becomes unfashionable, and if it is easy to choose right-handedness, you
may participate in converting left-handedness from a common, innocuous
characteristic-even a proud one-to one so rare, that, in order not to
inflict that kind of rarity on a child, people would avoid it. A normal
characteristic would thus become a "pathology," a stigma, through a myriad
of uncoordinated individual choices.' 9
In fact, most bioethicists appear to have adopted the premise that there is
nothing to say about reproductive decision-making once one has insisted that
it be free of coercion and autonomous. Hence, there is extraordinary silence
in the face of evidence that sex selection is common and increasing.20 But,
as Diane B. Paul has argued most cogently,2 however much we may regret
it, reproductive decisions do have important moral and social consequences,
and the questions they raise will not disappear if we plead technical
difficulties and ignore them. Instead, they will simply be answered by habit,
law, and the market-all without benefit of ethical analysis.
For ethicists to consider these problems, requires an expanded conception
of the meaning of bioethics. We need not adopt Aldo Leopold's ideas, but we
might wish to be inspired by his aspirations:
An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological
situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that the
path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual.
Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such
situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-
making.22
The technical field of bioethics-the part that can be interpreted as normal
science-cannot carry this burden alone. That tension between crisis and
paradigm which, in the natural sciences, is enforced by experiment must, in
the healing art of bioethics, be supplied by continued criticism. Bioethics
requires new perspectives more than it needs new paradigms.
In one of his most evocative essays, Sir Karl [Popper] traces the origin of
"the tradition of critical discussion [which] represents the only practicable
way of expanding our knowledge" to the Greek philosophers between
Thales and Plato, the men who, as he sees it, encouraged critical discussion
19. Thomas C. Schelling, Choosing Our Children's Genes, in GENETIC RESPONSIBILITY: ON
CHOOSING OUR CHILDREN'S GENES 101, 106 (Mack Lipkin, Jr. & Peter T. Rowley eds., 1974).
20. For an account of medical geneticists' attitudes, see Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal
Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1989, at 21.
21. See Diane B. Paul, Eugenic Anxieties, Social Realities, and Political Choices, 59 SOC. RES. 663,
679 (1992).
22. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 203 (1949).
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both between schools and within individual schools. The accompanying
description of Presocratic discourse is most apt, but what is described does
not at all resemble science .... In an sense, to turn Sir Karl's view on its
head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the
transition to a science. Once a field has made that transition, critical
discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are
again in jeopardy. Only when they must choose between competing theories
do scientists behave like philosophers.'
Whether we like it or not, bioethicists are philosophers.
23. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery, supra note 4, at 1, 6-7 (citations omitted).
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